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Notes and Comments
LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTROL OF ABORTION
The purpose of this note is to discuss the problem of abortion from
the criminal, civil, and social aspects. The necessity for this broad
treatment is underlined by the fact that although abortion is considered to be a crime everywhere there are perhaps a half million
criminal abortions annually' in this country, which have resulted m
only a negligible number of prosecutions each year.2 Since tis indicates that the frequency of occurrence of criminal abortion is not
being lessened materially by the statutes now in force prohibiting it,
perhaps the very nature of the problem is such that more than legal
enactment is required to combat the problem. Therefore, following
a discussion of criminal and civil liability for abortion suggestions for
extra-legal control of abortion will be presented.
Abortion As a Crtme
At common law the offense of procuring an abortion was treated
only as an offense against the life of the child. It was not considered
a crime against the person of the mother, or against God and religion.
The concept of abortion, existing as a crime against morals, is to be
found in modem treatises and modem statutes.3
Abortion is made a statutory crime in practically all jurisdictions
by statutes which vary to some extent in their respective provisions. 4
The elements of the crme of abortion are twofold: first, there must be
the intent to procure or cause the miscarriage and, second, there must
be an overt act directed toward carrying out the intent. The mere
intention to perform an abortion is not sufficient to constitute the
crime. 5 In the words of the Kentucky Statute, the overt act is comany
mitted by "any person who prescribes or administers
drug, medicine or other substance, or uses any instrument or other
means

"6

The accused need not personally administer the medicine or drug
'Dunn, Frequency of Abortions, TBE ABORTiON PROBLEM, 1 (1944).
'Kross, The Abortion Problem Seen in Criminal Courts, THE ABORTxON

108 (1944).
'State v. Cooper, 22 N. J. Law 52, 54 et. seq. (1849).
'The Kentucky statute on abortion is found m Ky. Rxv.
436.020 (1948).
'State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 178, 136 A. 817 (1927).
'Supra, note 4.
PROBLEM,

STAT.,

ANN., Sec.
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to the woman. The sending of medicine and directions for taking it
constitutes the overt act requirement of admnstermg or prescribing
it.7 If the defendant induces a woman to use instruments upon herself to effect an abortion, this will be sufficient as an overt act to complete the crine.8 As to the use of instruments, the exact nature of
the instrument need not be established to obtain a conviction under
abortion statutes.9
Statutes vary as to whether it is an essential element of the crime
for the woman to be actually pregnant. The necessity that the woman
be pregnant and the requisite stage of pregnancy depends upon the
wording of the statute. Under statutes similar to that in Kentucky,
which provides that the crime shall consist of administering "to any
woman Nwho he has reason to believe pregnant" it has been held that
actual pregnancy is immaterial if the accused thought that pregnancy
existed.1 Also, where a statute provides for the punishment of an
attempt to procure a miscarriage of "any woman" without stating that
she must be a "pregnant" woman, it is immaterial whether the woman
was actually pregnant or not. :i Where, however, the statute penalizes
on a "pregnant"
procuring or attempting to procure a miscarriage
2
woman, proof of pregnancy is essential.1
Another problem arises when the foetus is dead at the time of performance of the abortion. There is a conflict of authority on this
point.i 3 Of course, if the sole purpose of the statute is to protect the
unborn child, proof of death of the foetus will exonerate the abortionist from criminal liability However, where the purpose behind the
statute is to protect the life and health of the mother as well as the
life of the child,1 4 the accused abortionist will be held guilty of the
crime regardless of the fact the foetus was dead when the abortion
was performed. Under the latter situation, the accused will be exonerated if he can prove that it was necessary to remove the dead
foetus in order to save the woman s life.i 5
It may be argued that where the foetus is dead the danger of infection is such as to necessitate an abortion to protect a woman's life.
7

Bums v. State, 75 Ark. 453, 84 S.W 723 ( ........
); State v. Morrow, 40 S.C.

221, 18 S.E. 853 (1893); 1 CoB. Jua. SEcuN., 315 et seq.
'Wilson v. State, 36 Okl. Cr. 148, 252 P. 1106 (1927).

' Greenwood v. State, 3 Old. Cr. 247, 105 P. 371 (1909).
'0 Bassett v. State, 41 Ind. 303 (1872).

1Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144 (1898); Comm. v. Henry Taylor,
132 Mass. 261 (1882); People v. Axelsen, 223 N. Y. 650, 119 N.E. 708 (1918).
"State v. Stewart, 52 Iowa 284, 3 N.W 99 (1879); Com. v. Nailor, 29 Pa.
Super. Ct. 271 (1905).
1 Coa. JUR. SECuM., 318 (1936).
" State v. Tipple, 89 Ohio St. 35, 105 N.E. 75 (1913).
"Supra, note 13.
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Nevertheless this necessity of removal of the dead foetus m order to
save the woman s life must exist prior to any acts of abortion and must
be clearly proved. The wisdom behind this necessity of proof was
ably stated in the Ohio case of State v Tippie.'0
In Kentucky the death of the foetus is material only where its removal is necessary to save the woman s life.' 7 In Fitch v Commonwealth,'8 a nineteen year old girl went to a physician m Catlettsburg,
Kentucky, m order to procure the abortion. The physician performed
operations on three different occasions. When he was prosecuted
under the Kentucky statutes, he testified that before attempting to
operate, he was convinced professionally that the foetus was already
dead because of drugs the girl had taken prior to visiting him and that
the removal of the foetus was necessary to save her life. The court
said that the burden of proving want of necessity could be satisfied by
circumstantihl evidence, such as by showing (as was done m this case)
that the woman was m normal condition when the abortion was performed.
At common law it was no crime to procure a miscarriage until
after the quickening of the foetus became manifest. The theory behind
this view was that the offense was against the life of the child and
could not be complete until the child had, in a legal sense, become
alive. 19 However, under the modem type of statute like Kentucky s the
crime is complete if the act is committed before quickening,2- the policy behind the more modern statutes is, as we have seen, to protect
the health and life of the mother against the consequences of the act.
Abortion is a crime, with or without the consent of the woman.
This is provided by statute m Kentucky 2' where, infact, the woman
is competent to testify as a witness.2 2 Abortion statutes are usually
directed against persons committing the act and not against a woman
upon whom the act is committed, notwithstanding that it may be done
16

Supra, note 14.
If physicians and surgeons may assist wives and mothers vho
have practiced feticide upon themselves, by giving them relief after

the death of the fetus, the policy of the law will be defeated, and the
abortiomst will have an easy way of evading detection and pumshment.
He will have only to instruct the woman in the first use of an instrument, and then operate upon the fetus under conditions thus produced,

which indicate that it is dead, and, upon his testimony that he believed it was dead, evade criminal liability.""7
' Supra, note 14 at 36, N.E. at 77.
"291 Ky. 748, 165 S.W 2d 558 (1942).
"1 CoR. JuR. SEcUN., 318 (1936).
"Supra, note 4.
"Supra, note 4 (subsection 3).

Ibid.
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with her knowledge and consent, and that she, as a general rule, incurs no criminal liability 23 There is authority, however, for the view
that the woman is a participant in the crime,24 and it has been held
that she may be convicted of a conspiracy with others to commit the
crime of abortion on herself..2 ' There are statutes which punish the
woman for soliciting abortive medicine from any person or for submitting to an illegal operation. 26
In conclusion of the discussion of the criminal aspect it can be
said that Kentucky s abortion law is a comprehensive one2 7 covering
all the phases of this offense, from the attempt to commit the abortion
and the causing of a miscarriage, to the subsequent death of an unborn
child or a mother. For each more serious phase a more stringent penalty is provided. However, m order to discourage women from seeking
to have abortions performed it is submitted that the woman, too, should
be penalized by the statute. After all, it is often she who initiates
the commission of the crime. As the law now stands in this and many
jurisdictions the woman knows she will be considered the "innocent
victim" while the person from whom she sought help will be the one
to serve the prison term. The following statute is therefore respectfully submitted to correct this anomaly in the law It is on the statute
books in New York:
"A pregnant woman, who takes any medicine, drug, or
substance, or uses or submits to the use of any instrument or other
means, %ith intent thereby to produce her own rmscamage, unless the
same is necessary to preserve her life, or that of the child whereof she
is pregnant, is punishable by impnsonment for not less than one year,
nor more than 4 years."'

Since the necessity of having an abortion performed in order to
save the woman s life is the only valid defense in prosecution for abor-

tion, it is suggested that this necessity be determined by at least two
physicians, and that their signed statements be required. This will
help avoid the possibility of a fraudulent declaration of necessity by
one physician.
'State v. Smith, 99 Iowa 26, 68 N.W 428 (1896); 1 Aa~f. Jun. 184 (1936).
"State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 64 P. 1014 (1901); Wells v. New Eng. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 A. 126 (1899).
'State v. Crofford, 133 Iowa 478, 110 N.W 921 (1907).
- Axuz. CODE ANN., Sec. 43-301 (1939); N. Y. Penal Lav, Art. 1, Sec. BI

(Thompson s, 1939).
'GREGonY,

(1918).
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AND FoRMs, section 184

'-N. Y. Penal Law, Art. 6, Sec. 81 (Thompson, 1939). See also, ARz.
ANN., Sec. 43-301 (1939).

CODE
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Civil Liability
29

It is a well settled rule in civil actions that a woman who consents to the illegal act of abortion is barred from recovery for injuries
resulting from the operation. The court applied the maxim of volenti
non fit injuria;that is, no legal wrong is done to her who consents. 30
Kentucky has long been in accord with this rule. In an early case
an action was filed on the ground that the plaintiff was induced to go
to Louisville and submit to an attempted abortion by a doctor hired

by the defendants. The court of appeals reversed for the defendants
on appeal and held that one who consents to an assault or injury at
the hands of another cannot maintain a civil action for damages sustamed thereby The court gave the additional reason that "one cannot profit by his own wrong."
The rule of consent as applied to the abortion cases is contrary to
the majority rule as applied to other civil actions involving a breach
of the peace or acts forbidden on grounds of public policy "In an
action for assault and battery, if the act complained of amounts to a
breach of the peace, or if forbidden on grounds of public policy, it
is held by courts that the consent is illegal, and the maxim of volenti
non fit inluria does not apply" 31 Thus, recovery can be had for injuries sustained on ground that one cannot consent to an illegal act.
Kentucky has not recognized this public policy of treating the consent
as illegal, but applies the same rule to breach of the peace cases as it
does to abortion cases where a civil action is filed to recover from
32
injury from these illegal acts and bars recovery in both instances.
It might be argued that society would be better protected from
abortions ff the plaintiff's consent were disregarded and the woman
were allowed to sue for injuries to her. This encouragement of civil
suits in abortion cases would perhaps bring to light facts which may
be used in criminal actions. Crimmal abortions are by their nature

secret transactions, and, as has been pointed out, supra, ordinarily
escape the criminal laws. Thus, by making the abortionist respond in
damages to the woman, the public policy is served better than by not
penalizing him at all. 33 Perhaps, too, the abortionist would be deterred

from his illegal profession if he knew he might subject himself to civil
liability thereby, as well as to crminal liability However, this argu' Note, 34 IowA

LAw REv. 719 (1949).
' Goldnamer v. O'Bnen, 33 S.W 831, 98 Ky. 569 (1896).
"Note, 23 MicH. LAw Rlv. 80 (1924).
"Lykms v. Hamnck, 144 Ky. 80, 137 S.W 852 (1911).
'Miller v. Bayer, 94 Wis. 123, 68 N.W 869 (1896); Milhiken v. Heddesheumer, 110 Ohio St. 381, 144 N.E. 264 (1924); Lembro v. Donnell, 117 Me. 143,
103 A. 11 (1918).
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ment seems to be outweighed by the fact that such a rule might encourage blackmail. Also, the woman is in pan delicto with the abortionist and m most cases she is probably the initiator of the crime, and
should not be allowed to profit by her own wrong. Furthermore, it
may be pointed out that to permit the woman to recover m a civil
action might be inconsistent with the imposition of the proposed crimmal liability on her, suggested previously by the writer, because she
would be allowed to recover civilly for the very act for which she
could be punished crimnmally
Social Aspect
There are good reasons why the law alone cannot effectively solve
the abortion problem. The strictness with which criminal statutes
are enforced is in direct ratio to public opinion. When the public is
aroused by the viciousness of a particular crime, the law is likely to
be strictly enforced. However, when public opinion is lukewarm or
divided, the problem of law enforcement is tremendously increased.
"1 It is safe to say that the greatest obstacle so far encountered to
the legal control of abortions is public indifference."34 Many citizens
and public officials look upon criminal abortions with toleration, the
citizens because they don't care, and some officials because (as mnthe
gambling situation) it is easier for them to convince themselves that
there is nothing morally reprehensible m accepting bribes or protection
money from abortionists. 35 It is difficult to obtain evidence to secure
convictions. The only alternative, then, if the problem of abortion is
to be solved, is to turn to control other than statutory and pumitive.
It is submitted that the abortion problem is primarily a problem of
education because the law itself cannot overcome the lack of knowledge, the lack of social opportunity, and the lack of religious training.3' One solution, therefore, is to give more thorough sex education
in our public schools and colleges. Should young married couples
have to wait until they are overwhelmed with the problems of a large
family before being informed of contraceptive measures of planned
parenthood? 37 It is fallacious to look to the courts or to the legislature
alone for the solution to the abortion problem. It is the job of the
educators. It is the task of the medical profession, at whose command
lies a vast store of knowledge on this subject, to suggest measures
"Amen, Some Obstacles to Effective Legal Control of Criminal Abortion,
TiHE ABORTION PROBLEM, p. 183, 135 (1944).

' Ibid.
p cit., supra, note 2 at 109.

SId.
at 110.
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essential to the community The legislatures will set up agencies to
carry out these measures and then the doctors must see that the
agencies are properly enlightened and that the men and women placed
3s
m charge of administration are equipped with knowledge.
Doctor George M. Cooper assembled the suggestion for abortion
control given by specialists in obstetrics and gynecology in North
Carolina and presented these suggestions to a conference on abortion
held at the New York Academy of Medicine in 1942. 39 Here are a few
of the major suggestions he offered.
1. Sex education, especially for girls, should be given m high schools,
colleges and other places where girls are available in groups.
2. Contraceptive clinics should be established for the poorer class
of women.
3. Better teaching should be given m all the medical schools on all
these subjects.
4. Sterilization of one partner or the other when medical indications
and economic conditions justify should be allowed. (This writer would
hasten to disagree with this suggestion of sterilization merely because
economic conditions justify Where sterilization is given for medical
reasons there can be little disagreement.)
5. Institutions should be established to take care of many of the
girls who slip for the first time, such institutions to provide adequate
medical care, complete protection from publicity in their home communities, and satisfactory adoption of the babies later on. Such mstitutions would have to provide also for the economic rehabilitation of such
girls and their restoration back to their families. In this way many of
them would perhaps profit by their mistakes.
In the final analysis, any plan to promise success for the control
of abortion, should be set up on sound medical principles, and to be
permanent must be administered through and by the responsible public
40
agency such as the state board of health.
MYER S. Turxou

' Ibid.
Cooper, The Possibilities of a Statewide Program on Abortion Control, THE
ABORTION PROBLEM, p.

'OId. at 169.

163, 168 (1944).

